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ABSTRACT – A crisis affecting every geographic region and 
every socioeconomic segment of the United States is threatening 
the future viability of emergency and trauma care in America.   
As the financial and social burden of providing trauma care 
has fallen on individual states, hospitals and physicians, record 
numbers of emergency departments and trauma centers have 
been forced to close.  The ultimate cost of these closures falls 
upon  patients  who  will  receive  inadequate  emergency  and 
trauma care.  In the fall of 2004 King Drew Medical Center 
Trauma  Services,  the  second  largest  trauma  center  in  Los 
Angeles County, closed.  Continuing on this path may threaten 
the emergency and trauma care in the United States, touted as 
one of the finest in the world.  This article provides a general 
overview of the trauma center crisis in California and reviews the 
history of the problem and its future implications in California 
as well as the United States. 
INTRODUCTION
Trauma care funding is in a state of crisis with record 
numbers of Emergency Departments (EDs) and trauma centers 
closing nationwide.  Between 2002 and 2005, 52 trauma centers 
were closed: five level 1 trauma centers, 13 level 2 trauma 
centers, 9 level 3 trauma centers and 5 level 4 and 5 trauma 
centers.  California is no exception to this current national trend.   
In the fall of 2004, the closure of Los Angeles (LA) County’s 
second largest trauma center, King Drew Medical Center, further 
added to the trauma care challenges in LA County.  From 990 
through 2000, the number of licensed emergency departments 
in California decreased 0% while the population growth was 
continued at 5%.2 
Almost 50,000 Americans die each year from injuries, 
making trauma the leading cause of death and disability among 
both children and adults.  Trauma is not a problem isolated to 
inner-city and/or impoverished areas; it can happen to anyone 
at anytime.  The demographics of the patients treated in trauma 
centers  include  60%  motor  vehicle  collisions  (MVCs),  3% 
falls    and  2%  assaults.3 Although  both  trauma  centers  and 
non-trauma centers provide care for trauma patients, the overall 
risk of death has been shown to be 25% lower when care was 
provided at a trauma center.2  In 2003, 678,000 injury victims 
benefited  from  evaluation  and  treatment  in  regional  trauma 
centers.5
The financial implications of treating trauma patients 
are substantial.  The U.S. trauma center costs in 2003 were 
estimated at $0 billion, and total trauma center losses were 
estimated  at  $  billion  (0%  of  costs).  5 A  central  focus  of 
the trauma center crisis is to keep trauma centers functioning 
with a healthy balance sheet.  This can often be simplistically 
viewed as an issue limited to fair and adequate reimbursement; 
however, there are other exacerbating factors that should be 
considered to properly realize the scope and complexity of the 
trauma crisis issue.  These factors include difficulty in recruiting 
and retaining physicians and nursing staff, lack of accurate data, 
paucity of useful trauma databases and linkages to other related 
data systems, and geographic challenges.6
The current trauma crisis is the result of decades of 
incomplete  solutions  and  ineffective  advocacy.    Blame  can 
be placed on many parties including patients, policy experts, 
lawmakers, hospitals, and physicians.  A May 989 editorial 
in Trustee, “The impact of trauma center closings,” written by 
Hospitals Magazine Editor Howard Larkin, is haunting in its 
summation of what he foresaw as an impending crisis.  Larkin 
wrote, “The collapse of trauma networks affects not only the 
relatively few designated trauma centers, but emergency services 
in all urban hospitals.  As gaps in trauma networks widen, the 
burden of uncompensated trauma care increases in community 
hospital  emergency  departments.”7    Those  predictions  have 
become a realized crisis in Los Angeles with the closure of King 
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Drew Medical Center Trauma Services in 2004.  
The  signs  of  a  national  crisis  became  apparent  5 
years ago (the summer before Larkin’s editorial) when three 
hospitals in Los Angeles had threatened to close their emergency 
departments.  And when one of the top hospitals in the nation, 
the  University  of  Chicago,  pulled  out  of  its  local  trauma 
network,  trauma  admissions  quadrupled  at  a  nearby  medical 
center even as its losses skyrocketed to $400,000 in the first 
three months.7  Today that nearby hospital, formerly one of the 
best in the Midwest, sits mostly empty, cycling through potential 
bankruptcy and bailout.  Substantial steps have been taken in the 
past to support the trauma system, one being the Federal Trauma 
Care Systems Planning and Development Act enacted in 990.   
With this act came centralized organization and funding support 
from the newly created Division of Trauma and EMS (DTEMS).8   
However, due to budget deficits in 1995 the DTEMS was not 
reauthorized by Congress and the agency quietly disappeared. 8  
EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
From  2002  through  2005,  52  trauma  centers  closed 
nationwide.   Three factors inherent to the trauma care crisis 
in California and nationwide are: () poor reimbursement rate 
and difficulty with funding strategies5,9; (2) increasing rates of 
medical malpractice insurance0,; and (3) the lack of physician 
on-call support. 
A.    Poor  reimbursement  rate  and  difficulty  with  funding 
strategies 
A  fundamental  trauma  center  financial  strategy  is 
called “cost-shifting,” which entails charging insured patients 
more to cover uncompensated costs of treating uninsured and 
underinsured patients as presented in Figure . 5  
This  method  of  funding  can  no  longer  support  the 
trauma system, as the number of unfunded and under-funded 
patients has been increasing. 5  From 998 to 200 ED visits 
increased  3.4%,  whereas  the  population  increased  5.6 
percent.2  Approximately 6.5 million Californians, 20% of the 
state’s population, were uninsured, a number that is growing by 
70,000 per month.3,4  The underpayment to the trauma system 
in  a  three-year  period  included  30,000  unpaid  claims  to  the 
Department of Health Services (DHS), $2 million annual loss 
from commercial HMOs, and a 23% payment rate by Medi-Cal 
HMO, leaving the system grossly underfunded. 3  Nationwide, 
about 8% of trauma patients in the United States are uninsured.   
With an average bill of $4,896, of which hospitals only recover 
8% of the total cost, providing care for the uninsured leads to a 
national loss of $ billion per year by trauma centers.3
A  dramatic  rise  in  ED  visits  coupled  with  unstable 
funding and poor reimbursement rates can lead to trauma center 
closures.  This in turn forces many hospitals to go on diversion 
status, unable to take on new patients and diverting ambulances 
to  other  hospitals.    Hospital  diversion  is  affected  by  many 
factors, which include ED overcrowding, patients being held in 
the ED while waiting for floor and ICU beds, and nursing ratios.   
The ED overcrowding in turn would have patient consequences 
including lower quality of care offered, long waiting room times, 
prolonged pain and suffering, and violence in the ED.3 
B.  Increasing rates of medical malpractice insurance
Medical malpractice premiums have been an important 
issue for many years mainly due to the direct effect they have on 
physicians, but also for the indirect effects they have 
Figure .  National Trauma Center Reimbursement, 2004.  
Profile printed with permission from the National Foundation 
for Trauma Care.2  
on  patients.    Medical  malpractice  premiums  can  affect  the 
diversity and availability of specialists in a given region.  These 
premiums  often  differ  by  medical  specialty  and  geography.   
In some specialties such premium rates increased about 5 % 
on average and over 00 % in some states from 996 through 
2002.0      Subsequently,  many  physicians  decided  to  retire 
early, close high-risk sections of their practices or leave certain 
states such as West Virginia, Mississippi, and Nevada.5  Some 
reports indicate that rates of growth in malpractice premiums 
and  claims  payments  have  been  slower  in  states  that  have 
enacted non-economic damage caps.0   Since California has 
the  most  comprehensive  and  effective  legislation  regarding 
medical malpractice and tort reform according to the American 
Medical Association, this out-migrating doctor phenomenon 
might not impact to California to the same degree.  However, 
the provider’s reaction to the malpractice threat may limit the 
consumer’s access to health care and may encourage physicians 
to practice “defensive medicine,” which further increases total 
health care costs. 0   The California Journal of Emergency Medicine VII:4, Dec. 2006  Page 83
C.   Lack of physician on-call support 
Per the 2006 Physician On-call Pay Survey Report, nearly 
one-quarter of trauma centers and 3% of non-trauma centers 
have closed due to a lack of physicians available to provide 
on-call service.6,7 There are various reasons for the shortage of 
on-call specialists, including:
•  Increase in uninsured patients:Trauma centers’ share 
of  uninsured  patients  is  expanding  along  with  the 
overall uninsured population.  The increased number 
of  uninsured  patients  creates  more  difficulty  with 
reimbursement both to hospitals and physicians.  Many 
specialists find that it is increasingly difficult to get 
paid for care provided to these uninsured patients.8  
•  Undesirable lifestyle: Many physicians have found that 
trauma and on-call services are quite disruptive to their 
family life as well as their daily private practice care of 
patients. 8 
•  Higher insurance premiums :   Many high-risk procedures 
are performed emergently in the ED without sufficient 
time for optimum results or opportunity to establish the 
best rapport between physicians and patients.  Thus, 
the insurance premiums for doctors who serve as on-
call specialists and for trauma physicians are higher 
and sometimes not available.8,9 
•  Underpayment:  Downcoded on-call fee reimbursement 
from  health  plans,  Medicare  reimbursement  cuts 
and  billing  codes  that  fail  to  reflect  time  and  skill 
requirement for adequate trauma care, all make on-call 
services unfavorable for physicians. 9 
Interventions And Solutions: 
California And Beyond
 
In late 2004, the National Foundation for Trauma Care 
(NFTC)  Board  surveyed  selected  hospital  senior  executives 
about the causes and potential resolutions for trauma center 
closures. The solutions identified by the executives included 
increases in DRG reimbursement through insurers, increased 
physician payments, adjustments for on-call payments, capping 
malpractice payments and assistance with underfunded care.20 
(See Figure 2). 
A.  Difficulty with funding strategies 
Maddy EMS fund— The Maddy Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS) Fund, created in 987, allows each county to 
establish its own EMS Fund to be administered by the county 
itself or to have it administered by the California Department 
of  Health  Services  (DHS).2    Most  large  counties  opt  to 
administer their own fund, while smaller counties have their 
funds administered by the DHS.  The EMS Fund is designed 
to allow each county to reimburse physicians and hospitals for 
losses when emergency care is provided to patients who are 
either unable to pay or fail to pay.  The Maddy EMS Fund was 
originally funded by a $ penalty charge on moving violations 
and this amount was increased to $2 in 988.  To further support 
the fund cigarette taxes were added in 989.2  The funding 
amount has remained at $24.8 million per year for the past 5 
years.22
Emergency Medical Care Initiative—  The Emergency 
Medical Care Initiative (EMCI), also known as Proposition 67, 
was a ballot initiative designed to restructure the emergency 
medical care funding in the state of California with a potential 
influx of over $500 million into the trauma system.  EMCI would 
have been funded by a 3% surcharge on telephone usage, where 
residential users would have paid a maximum of 50 cents per 
month, and an average cell phone user would have paid about 
90 cents per month.  Senior citizens and people on basic phone 
rates would have been exempt from these taxes.23  The EMCI 
would have restructured the current Maddy EMS Fund system to 
become a component of a new umbrella fund.  The distribution   
of these funds was shown in Figure 3.24,25  The November 2, 2004 
ballot measure resulted in the defeat of the EMCI Proposition 67 
with 7.6% voters opposed to the proposal.26  Some opponents 
to Proposition 67 argued that the increase in phone taxes was 
excessive and that there were insufficient revenues earmarked 
to improve the 9 system.
Tax on improvements on developed property—  In 2002, Los 
Angeles County voters approved an annual tax of three cents 
per square foot of improvements on developed property to help 
fund  trauma  care  providers.   The  measure  was  projected  to 
Figure 2. Potential solutions from Hospital Senior Executive 
Survey printed by permission from the National Foundation for 
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generate $74 million annually and demonstrated the public’s 
willingness to tax themselves to maintain trauma services.9 
Sales tax—  In Alameda County, voters approved an 
additional half-cent sales tax to help their trauma care services.   
Estimated to generate $95 million annually, 75% of tax revenues 
are distributed to Alameda County Highland Hospital, and 25% 
may  be  used  for  other  purposes,  including  uncompensated 
care.6
State    budget  allocations—  The  Legislature  and 
Governor decided to fund trauma care an additional $27.5 million 
for fiscal year 2001-2002 and $20 million for 2002-2003.  Due to   
California’s critical budget shortfalls, trauma care funds were 
not included for the 2003-2004 state budgets.  On July 9, 
2005, $0 million in general fund money was approved in the   
Governor’s budget for trauma care funding.9
Trauma care systems planning and development act—   
Senator Bill Frist from Tennessee along with Senators Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and Edward Kennedy sponsored legislation, 
S.239,  to  re-enact  the  Trauma  Care  Systems  Planning  and 
Development Act in January 2003, which as of last reading in 
February 2005 has not yet passed the Committee on Finance.27,28   
The bill would double the current funding from $6 million to 
$2 million for trauma systems development and includes a 
one-time $750,000 allocation to the Institute of Medicine for a 
study on the state of trauma care and research.  The bill would 
also  improve  federal  funding  match  requirements  to  assist 
states with their financing of trauma care.  Currently the federal 
government does not require contribution of state funds for the 
first year, requires a matching payment of $1 for every federal 
dollar in the second year, and $3 for every $ for every year 
thereafter.  The new law would provide grants for the first two 
years without requiring states to contribute matching funds, 
the third year would be a $ for $ arrangement, and thereafter the 
federal government would provide $ for every $2 contributed by 
the state.27
B.  Resolution of increasing rates of medical malpractice insurance: 
medical malpractice reform
  Nationwide,  considerations  have  included  tort  reform 
with caps on damages for pain and suffering.  States with certain 
non-economic  damage  caps,  California  for  example,  had  lower 
recent growth in malpractice premium rates and claim payments.0 
Moreover, patient-centered and safety-focused reforms also should 
be  considered,  since  most  medical  errors  resulted  from  system 
errors  and  unfavorable  conditions.    These  reforms  encourage 
physicians  to  improve  communications  and  feel  that  they  are 
allowed to apologize.  Mandatory reporting systems will be applied 
so that “adverse events” and errors will be used to identify system 
weaknesses and to improve patient care.  Another suggested avenue 
for improvement is to have insurance commissioners evaluate rates 
and trends and track comprehensive data on medical malpractice 
claims. 9
C.  Resolution of lack of physician on-call support
  Increasing  funds,  improving  reimbursement  rates  and 
correcting  high  medical  malpractice  insurance  may  resolve 
many portions of this problem.  Some organizations have created 
measures to encourage physicians to provide on-call services, such 
as  guaranteed  level  of  payment  for  services  provided,  subsidy 
for malpractice, fee-for-service payments for uninsured patients, 
hourly rates while providing in hospital on-call patient care, and 
payments based on work Relative Value Unit.7  However, all of 
these measures can make trauma care significantly more expensive, 
which has been one of the challenges for trauma systems all along. 
Role of Injury Prevention
  More than 29 millions patients who visited the ED in 2004 
were injured from preventable trauma.  Unintentional injuries were 
the fifth leading cause of death across all ages and and the leading 
cause in the -44 years old age group as reported by the CDC in 
PROPOSITION 67
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF NEW REV-
ENUE FROM SURCHARGE INCREASE
(in Millions)
Account                                                   Estimated Revenue
9 Account                                $     4
Emergency & Trauma st Responders Account    9
Community Clinics Urgent Care Account    25
Emergency & Trauma Physician Uninsured Acct                 53
Emergency & Trauma Hospital Services Acct                      300 
TOTALa		 	 	 																							$		500 
a Total may not sum to $500 million due to rounding
Figure 3. Estimated distribution of new revenue
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2003.  Given the significant impact of such injuries on ED care, 
the role of injury prevention becomes more important in treating 
the overall burden of disease in the U.S.29,30  
   In 2000 about 50 million injuries occurred and cost 
approximately  $406  billion,  while  many  could  have  been   
prevented ($80.2 billion medical care costs and $326 billion 
in productivity losses).3  In addition to finding new revenues, 
injury prevention should be utilized more effectively to address 
this national crisis.  Injury prevention can provide significant 
realized cost saving as well as directly contribute to a decrease 
in mortality and morbidity. 
 SUMMARY
Emergency departments and trauma centers have been 
in constant crisis for many years.  Trauma care is under-funded 
by the populus at large, despite an expectation that every person 
in  the  U.S.  is  entitled  to  state-of-the-art  emergency  trauma 
care without discrimination on the basis of income, race, or 
geographical location.  The EMS/ED/Trauma system has shown 
over the past 40 years that it saves lives and has been willing 
to adapt to market forces.  Unfortunately, the economics of 
supply and demand along with an ever-changing health care 
system that leaves millions uninsured and underinsured have 
added to the current crisis.   The interdependence of emergency 
departments and trauma care and the provision of comprehensive 
emergency  medical  services  is  both  the  touchstone  of  our 
nation’s  emergency  care  system  and  its Achilles  heel.    The 
solution lies in establishing the fairest system of shared funding 
responsibility for a system that is accessible to everyone, yet 
one that is not misused.  As we improve emergency and trauma 
care by more effectively incorporating injury prevention, the 
solution to the trauma center crisis will likely become more 
manageable.    This  will  entail  a  firm  commitment  to  injury 
prevention coupled with a shared responsibility on the part of 
communities, physicians, and government to provide emergency 
and  trauma  care  that  is  both  safe  and  financially  viable.   
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